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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INCLUDING THE DCP IN THE 
MARITAL ESTATE. 
Wife's arguments regarding the DCP are lacking in evidentiary support and based 
on an incorrect theory of law. 
Wife's argument begins with an attack on the trial court's use of the Woodward 
formula to divide the DCP. Her characterization of the trial court's approach as "defec-
tive" and her claim that the trial court used "equitable adjustments" to ameliorate those 
"defects" has been addressed in Husband's opening brief. The trial court's application of 
the Woodward formula to identify separate and marital portions of retirement plans at the 
time of lump sum distribution was a reasonable and equitable method to separate Hus-
band's separate property from the marital estate. Wife's attack on the trial court's ap-
proach offers no reasonable alternative, and is a thinly disguised attempt to circumvent 
Husband's right under Utah law to retain his premarital property. 
Wife attempts to defend the trial court's decision to include the DCP in the marital 
estate by referring to the plan document, Restated Appendix D (Ex. R-13, pp. 47-52). 
Wife, however, offers no coherent interpretation of Appendix D, instead merely posing 
rhetorical questions. Wife's claim that benefit levels were not frozen is incorrect. The 
following provisions of Appendix D are relevant: 
• Section 2.1 provides that a participant who had five years of service as of 
October 11, 1989 is fully vested in the plan. There is no dispute that Hus-
band satisfied this requirement as of 1989. 
• Section 3.1 provides that the benefit calculation is "based on the partici-
pant's earnings as of January 1, 1990. 
• Section 4.1 provides that the participant must "survive" until retirement in 
order to receive benefits but does not, as Wife avers, provide that benefits 
continue to accrue based upon "years of service" past the date on which 
benefits were frozen. 
• Section 4.2 provides an age-based adjustment to the benefit described in 
Section 3.1, and is the source of Husband's assertion that the differences in 
benefits available at various ages of retirement are based solely on an inter-
est rate calculation, not upon "years of service." 
• Section 4.5 provides for an adjustment to the benefit calculation for partici-
pants in a class action lawsuit over PacifiCorp's termination of the DCP. 
Husband received a two earnings class move as a result of the 1993 class 
action settlement, which affected final benefits but did not affect eligibility 
under the plan. 
Simply put, the question before this Court is whether the fact that a participant was 
required to maintain his employment until retirement age, but did not accrue any addi-
tional years of service or any enhancement of benefit past the date upon which benefits 
were frozen, converts the benefit that was earned prior to the marriage into a marital as-
set. Mr. Smith's testimony was unrebutted that the different benefit levels at different 
ages were strictly the result of an interest rate calculation and had nothing to do with ac-
crual of years of service. (R. 370 pp. 176-77.) 
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Husband's position is that, because benefits were frozen in 1990, the benefit he 
ultimately received when he retired in 2001 was the benefit he had earned prior to 1990 
and reflected no marital enhancement. In essence, he asks this Court to recognize a 
distinction between benefits that are enhanced by effort during the marriage, and 
premarital benefits which are merely realized during the marriage. Wife's brief does not 
address the merits of this issue but merely offers conclusory assertions which are not 
based upon an accurate reading of Appendix D. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT HUSBAND'S 
RETIREMENT WITHDRAWALS WERE UNAUTHORIZED. 
In attempting to justify the trial court's inconsistent treatment of Husband's con-
tinuation of monthly retirement withdrawals, Wife asserts, without citation to the record, 
that Husband's earned income was sufficient to satisfy his obligations under the tempo-
rary alimony order. That argument is meaningless unless total expenses are considered, 
and is contrary to the position she took in her affidavit at the time. In fact, the record 
shows that expenses could not be met without Husband's retirement income. Wife's af-
fidavit at the time stated that she had net after-tax income of $2,624.28. She went on to 
state, "Upon information and belief, the respondent grosses the sum of $2,100.00 per 
month from retirement income and $2,626.72 from contract employment for a total 
amount of $4,736.92 per month." (R. 10.) She alleged that Husband had the ability to 
pay temporary alimony of $2,221.95 per month, a sum which exceeded his earned take 
home pay after taxes. (R. 14.) Husband was ordered to pay $800 per month in temporary 
alimony, plus $562.25 toward the second mortgage, and make the payments on all marital 
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debt except the first mortgage. Wife claimed living expenses, excluding the first mort-
gage on the home, of approximately $2,400.00 per month. (R. 12-14.) She sought to 
have all debt except the first mortgage paid by Husband, including $635.00 in identified 
monthly payments and an addition "unknown" amount on charge card debt of over 
$23,000.00. (R. 12.) It is readily apparent that Husband had no ability to meet all of 
these obligations, plus pay living expenses commensurate with Wife's living expenses, 
without his retirement income. 
Perhaps the best evidence that Husband's retirement income was necessary to 
support a finding of ability to pay alimony was the trial court's own finding after trial that 
Husband had the ability to pay only $500 per month in alimony, taking the $2,100 per 
month withdrawals into consideration as income. 
Wife's recitation of other withdrawals from various retirement accounts both be-
fore and during separation is irrelevant to the issue on appeal. The other withdrawals 
were acknowledged and the trial court's handling of them, which was largely by agree-
ment, has not been appealed. 
If the treatment of the $2,100 per month withdrawals was an "equitable adjust-
ment" to the property division, it was not based on evidence of or a finding of extraordi-
nary circumstances, and was therefore improper. Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 
373 f 27, 993 P.2d 887; Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239 f 23, 987 P.2d 603 
If, on the other hand, it was based on a finding of contempt, then the evidence did 
not support a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Husband knowingly dis-
obeyed the temporary order. Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Hawaii, Inc. v. Bad Ass Coffee Ltd. 
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Partnership, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1255 n.7 (D. Utah 2000) (citing Cheffv. Schnacken-
berg, 384 U.S. 373(1966)). 
Wife argues that her burden of proof on this issue was not raised in the trial court. 
The lower court, however, made no finding of contempt. It simply stated that its treat-
ment of the monthly withdrawals was "[bjoth as an equitable adjustment. . . and also be-
cause of paragraph 8 of the Temporary Order . . . ." (R. 320.) Husband's point on appeal 
is that the foregoing finding cannot justify the treatment of the withdrawals because it 
meets neither the standard of "exceptional circumstances" for an equitable adjustment nor 
the standard for a finding of civil contempt. Husband argued below that the temporary 
order had not been violated. (R. 373 p. 757.) The applicable legal standard for contempt, 
although not explicitly discussed, was implicit in the argument. Wife's argument is akin 
to arguing in an appeal of summary judgment that a party is precluded from presenting 
the summary judgment standard on appeal because Rule 56 was not read into the record. 
The evidence discussed in Husband's opening brief is plainly insufficient to support a 
finding of contempt by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial court's reliance on 
the temporary order as justification for an "equitable adjustment" was error under those 
circumstances. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S ALI-
MONY AWARD. 
Wife makes two points in response to Husband's contention that the alimony 
award in this case was inappropriate. 
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Wife's first argument is that Husband's standard of living argument requires mar-
shalling of the evidence.1 To the contrary, Husband's argument is a policy argument. 
Alimony is not an entitlement. Where there is no showing that Wife's standard of living 
and ability to provide self-support have materially changed during the marriage, alimony 
is not called for. In this case, the standard of living during the marriage was not shown to 
be remarkably different from the pre- or post-marriage standard. The only exception is 
that the parties took several cruises during the marriage, but those were funded by bor-
rowing and ultimately repaid by sale of the marital residence and withdrawals from Hus-
band's retirement accounts. This is not a factual scenario that justifies alimony. 
Wife asserts that she was "forced to find new housing because of the court-ordered 
sale of the parties' residence." She cannot appropriately rely on this sale as a justification 
for alimony for two reasons. First, she was not "forced" to move but rather asked the 
trial court to allow her to move and to order sale of the residence over Husband's objec-
tion. (R. 38.) Second, her new housing was not inferior to that which she had prior to the 
marriage, and thus her argument fails to rebut Husband's policy argument. 
Wife's other argument concerns the $2,100 monthly withdrawals.2 Wife attempts 
to justify the trial court's inconsistency regarding these withdrawals with the circular ar-
gument that they are an appropriate basis for an award of alimony because the trial court 
said so. Husband's argument, however, is that the trial court was inconsistent. If those 
1
 Wife's claim that the policy argument regarding standard of living was not made in the 
lower court is incorrect. See R. 384, pp. 59-60. 
2
 Wife's claim that this argument was not made in the court below is without merit. See 
R. 384, pp. 54-55. 
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withdrawals violated the temporary order, then they did so because they were a forbidden 
use of marital property. Having held that the withdrawals are property, the trial court's 
alimony award was essentially a disproportionate transfer of Husband's property to Wife. 
Consider an individual whose sole source of income is retirement assets. The trial 
court's approach either requires that no alimony can be awarded under such circum-
stances; or requires that the individual deplete the retirement assets to pay alimony, yet 
treats the assets as not having been depleted for purposes of the property distribution. 
This gives the recipient spouse a double benefit, receiving the withdrawn funds in the 
form of alimony and receiving them again as part of the property distribution. Indeed, 
that is exactly what happened here, as Husband withdrew the funds in order to pay tem-
porary alimony and to satisfy joint debt he was ordered to pay—obligations which he 
could not have paid without his retirement income—and was then ordered to restore the 
withdrawn funds for purposes of property distribution. The trial court's approach pro-
vided a windfall to Wife in this case, and is incompatible with ordinary concepts of in-
come and property in divorce. 
Husband believes that the more appropriate treatment of the withdrawals is as in-
come supporting the alimony award, but that position demands that the "equitable ad-
justment" which treated the payments as property must be reversed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INCLUDING THE LENOX 
COLLECTION IN THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
Wife's casting of the argument regarding the Lenox collection as one controlled 
by the standard of review is fundamentally flawed. While the trial court has broad discre-
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tion in dividing the marital estate, it does not have the same broad discretion to award one 
party's separate property to the other. To do that, "exceptional circumstances" are re-
quired. Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373 f 27, 993 P.2d 887; Thomas v. Thomas, 
1999 UT App 239 f 23, 987 P.2d 603 No finding of exceptional circumstances was 
made, or could be made, in this case. 
Wife contends that it is improper for Husband to "single out" one piece of prop-
erty and claim that it should not have been included in the marital estate. Her argument 
contradicts Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), which held that "the 
court should first properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or 
as the separate property of one or the other." Here, the trial court failed to properly cate-
gorize the Lenox collection. 
Thus, the real issue is whether there was evidence to support what the trial court 
did. Wife again attempts to avoid substantive review of this issue by calling upon the 
marshaling rule, but Husband marshaled the evidence on this point at pages 16-17 of his 
opening brief. Wife's recitation of evidence is duplicative of that cited in Husband's 
brief, except that Wife adds a twist to the evidence not supported by the testimony in the 
record. Wife did not testify that the only items in the Lenox collection that were pur-
chased for Husband's mother were the bird items. Rather, she testified that bird items 
were purchased for Husband's mother without limitation, and then stated that she did not 
know what had happened to those items. Nothing in Wife's testimony contradicted Hus-
band's direct testimony concerning which of the Lenox items were his pre-marital prop-
erty and which he had inherited from his mother upon her death. The trial court did not 
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have discretion to disregard the undisputed testimony on this point and handle the Lenox 
collection in violation of the Burt standard. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
WIFE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
To justify the attorney's fee award, Wife offers arguments that were not adopted 
by the trial court. The trial court's findings justifying the award of fees were: 
67. By virtue of his income and his large retirement assets, re-
spondent has the greater ability to pay attorney's fees. 
68. Petitioner has a need for assets to pay attorney's fees because 
she has less ability to earn income and because she needs to preserve the re-
tirement assets she has been awarded as she grows older. (R. 326.) 
The trial court, however, awarded alimony to Wife that by the court's own find-
ings exceeded Husband's ability to pay, so income disparity cannot justify the award of 
fees. Similarly, the trial court divided the marital retirement benefits equally, so a dispar-
ity in those amounts cannot justify the award of fees. In reality, the trial court directed 
Husband to liquidate a portion of his premarital assets to pay Wife's attorney's fees, in 
circumstances where it was not shown that Wife lacked the ability to pay fees from the 
property distribution she received in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in his opening brief, Husband 
requests that this Court affirm the division of the Basic Retirement Plan and the 401(k) 
Plan; that it reverse the division of the Deferred Compensation Plan and direct that the 
entire amount of that plan is Husband's separate property; that it reverse the trial court's 
treatment of withdrawals from the retirement accounts to the extent set forth in this brief; 
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that it reverse the trial court's "equitable adjustments;" that it reverse the inclusion of the 
entire Lenox collection in the marital estate; that it reverse the alimony award; and that it 
reverse the award of attorney's fees to Wife. 
DATED this YA_ day of June, 2006. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
N:\21686\1\REPLY BRIEF.DOC:6/8/06 
Rodney R. Parker 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
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